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This article assesses the recent trend of cooperation among antagonistic
private actors that results in the creation and implementation of issue-
specific transnational norms and rules and the subsequent shift from public
to private forms of governance. Many political scientists agree that
authority also exists outside of formal political structures. Private actors
increasingly begin to make their own rules and standards that acquire
authority beyond the international system. This observation is often
referred to as private transnational governance as opposed to public or
international governance. Although the concept of private governance
gains prominence in academic debates, it is not clear how private
governance on the global scale is constructed and maintained or what
specific or general conditions are necessary for private governance to
emerge. Based on the review of common theoretical propositions, this article
develops an integrated model along which the necessary conditions for the
emergence of private governance can be assessed and understood. As most
research has hitherto focused on institutionalized cooperation between
business actors (self-regulation), this article takes a closer look at those
transnational systems of rule that result out of the enhanced cooperation
between profit and nonprofit actors (coregulation).
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The privatization of world politics is a much-debated issue in contempo-
rary academic discourse (Brühl 2002; Cashore 2002; Clapp 1998; Savas
2000). However, whereas the provision of services by private actors such
as military companies or bond-rating agencies, and the implementation
and monitoring of international agreements have already been at the
center of debate for a while, the parallel development of cooperative rule
making by private actors, both from the profit and nonprofit camp, has
not received comparable attention.
As far as rules and norms are concerned, studies in international rela-
tions (IR) in general and global environmental politics in particular have
primarily focused on international regimes and intergovernmental orga-
nizations that have been designed to address transboundary problems.
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Nonstate actors have figured prominently on the research agenda of polit-
ical scientists for more than three decades and scholars have studied in
detail their role and function in agenda setting, lobbying governments,
and implementing international agreements (Arts 1998; Keck and Sikkink
1998; Raustiala 1997; Rowlands 2001; Weiss and Gordenker 1996). How-
ever, still little is known about the institutionalization of governance by
private, often antagonistic actors. Research has either focused on interfirm
cooperation as a source of private authority in the global political system
(Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999a; Hall and Biersteker 2002) or addressed
partnerships between different actors from all segments of society in
general, including business, civil society, and governments (Austin 2000;
Hemmati 2001; Willetts 2000).
As a result, the debate about nonstate actors and their new roles in
governance has been limited to public–private partnerships and global
public-policy networks (Dingwerth 2005; Witte, Reinicke, and Benner
2000). It has, to a large extent, neglected far-reaching institutionalizations
among private actors without the involvement of governments, govern-
ment agencies, or intergovernmental organizations. The underlying
assumption of this article is that the current process of private institution-
alization among a wide variety of business and nonprofit actors signifies
more than a greening of industry based on rationalistic interest calcula-
tions. Instead, we witness the emergence of transnational organization,
resulting from a variety of norm and rule systems on the global level,
from reporting schemes to certification and environmental management
standards, that exist primarily outside the international context. Conse-
quently, the impact of private actors on world politics has changed as
well. They have developed from being an intervening variable of the
international system to establishing rules that exist mainly outside of it.
But what explains this recent transformation? I argue that the condi-
tions for private governance to emerge can be assessed along two
interconnected lines of argumentation; focusing on the macrolevel of
conditions, including global economic transformations and contextual
factors on the international level; and the microlevel, including the spe-
cific structure of the problem as well as available organizational resources
of actors involved. The two condition levels are understood to form an
integrated model of private institutional emergence. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to highlight the actual linkages between the conditions in a more
process-oriented way than single-factor accounts usually display. The
theoretical and analytical significance of this article derives from the basic
questions it sets out to answer: First, how could we conceptualize the
novel phenomenon of private governance in world politics? Second, how
could we explain its existence? And third, given the rich literature on
questions of institutional formation, which analytical model is most
appropriate to do so?
Consequently, the article proceeds in three analytical steps. First, it
analyzes the shift from public to private governance and the corre-
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sponding institutionalization of cooperation between different private
transnational actors. Second, it seeks to establish a common framework
of analysis to understand the conditions of emergence of private institu-
tions based on common propositions found in the literature on (private)
regimes and private cooperation. Third, it introduces two empirical cases
to further substantiate the theoretical claims made in the preceding part.
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) provides an illustrative example
of transnational coregulation in the forest sector. In contrast to the Sus-
tainable Forest Initiative and the Pan European Forest Certification
Scheme, which both have been influenced by industry and public actors
and only recently are moving toward more organizational independence,
the FSC constitutes a genuine cooperative effort of profit and nonprofit
actors from its very beginning. The Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies (CERES), the second case presented in this article,
displays a different organizational form of private regulation. Here the
rules do not govern a specific issue area but are targeted toward the
everyday operations of companies in general. Achieving a better under-
standing of private rule making as one of the emerging phenomena in
world politics will not only broaden our theoretical understanding of
global governance but will also contribute to the much-needed institution
building for effective sustainable development.
 
FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF PRIVATE REGULATION
 
The last decade of the twentieth century has been called an era of part-
nership (Murphy 1998). Innovative forms of collaboration can be
observed in a range of different organizational settings and issue areas.
Firms may engage in strategic alliances with suppliers and competitors
and develop informal industry norms and practices or even formal pri-
vate regimes, regulating the behavior of a wide range of business actors
in sectors ranging from insurance to minerals and mining (Cutler, Haufler,
and Porter 1999a). International organizations seek the assistance of cor-
porations to implement universal social and environmental norms (U.N.
Global Compact), or engage in partnership with business actors and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to introduce a globally applicable
scheme for sustainable corporate reporting (Global Reporting Initiative
[GRI]). Civil society representatives on their term take part in negotiations
involving corporations, governments, and international organizations
with a view to establishing a sustainable framework for the planning and
operation of large-scale dams (World Commission on Dams).
These examples indicate at least three substantive shifts within world
politics. First, the locus of authoritative problem solving does not rest
with governments and their international organizations alone. Authority
is indeed relocated in many different settings, involving public–private
as well as purely private actor constellations. Second, the predominantly
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confrontational relation between companies, governments, and civil soci-
ety has been complemented by partnership as one possible mode of
interaction.
 
1
 
 And third, cooperation is getting more and more institution-
alized, resulting in social practices that effectively govern specific issue
areas. The term private governance encapsulates these important shifts
within one conceptual framework. It emphasizes the role of private
actors, both profit and nonprofit, in the establishment and maintenance
of issue-specific transnational rule systems in contrast to either private
agenda setting and lobbying or international rule making. Therefore,
private governance could be understood as a functional equivalent to
public forms of global governance involving states and intergovernmen-
tal institutions.
Global governance is generally believed to encompass different sys-
tems of rule on different levels of human activity as an organizing social
principle beyond hierarchical steering and the sovereign authority of
nation-states. As James Rosenau (1997, 27) notes, “global governance is
the sum of myriad—literally millions of—control mechanisms driven by
different histories, goals, structures, and processes.” The phenomenon
therefore not only covers “the activities of governments, but it also
includes the many channels through which ‘commands’ flow in the form
of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued” (Rosenau 1995,
14).
One of these possible channels is the realm of private governance. A
closer look at this phenomenon reveals that private governance consists
of at least three analytical dimensions: first, the procedural dimension of
governance, which emphasizes the activities of private transnational
actors; second, the structural dimension of governance, which highlights
the distinct “architecture” of a governance arrangement, including
norms and rules, networks and actor constellations, as well as formal or
informal links to other areas of governance; and third, the functional
dimension of governance, which focuses on the material and ideational
outcome of a private governance arrangement as a functional equivalent
to forms of national or international public governance. This three-
dimensional perspective on private governance is reflected in Falkner’s
(2003, 72–73) assumption that private governance “emerges at the global
level where the interactions among private actors . . . give rise to insti-
tutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behavior in an
issue-specific area.”
Consequently, the recent trend of private governance goes beyond the
phenomenon of privatization of world politics (Brühl, Debiel, Hamm,
Hummel, and Martens 2001), which, to a large extent, has been analyzed
as service provision and rule implementation by private actors. In addi-
tion, private governance includes new actor constellations and uncom-
mon alliances between a wide range of actors that go beyond coordination
or cooperation. Following Robert Keohane, cooperation can be defined as
adjustments of behavior toward mutual goals that contain some degree
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of obligation for all participants and thus extend cooperation into the
future (1984). In contrast:
 
governance . . . emerges out of a context of interaction that is institutionalized
and of more permanent nature. In a system of governance, individual actors
do not constantly decide to be bound by the institutional norms based on a
calculation of their interest, but adjust their behavior out of recognition of the
legitimacy of the governance system. (Falkner 2003, 73)
 
Therefore, cooperation and forms of private governance also differ
according to the authority involved in a specific actor constellation:
 
Cooperation that derives primarily from rational calculation of the direct payoff
from adjusting one’s behavior in a particular strategic situation may not involve
authority. Authority requires a basis in trust rather than calculation of immedi-
ate benefit, and therefore cooperation must involve the development of habits,
norms, rules, and shared expectations—cooperation must be institutionalized.
(Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999b, 334–335)
 
The emerging private institutions that result from enhanced cooperation
between antagonistic private actors can be understood as “social practices
consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or
conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles”
(Young 1989, 32). From a functional perspective, private institutions gov-
ern a distinct issue area through the development and subsequent imple-
mentation of regulations directed at the behavior of various actors.
Therefore, they can be qualified as private regulative institutions. The
resulting regulative rules take different forms, ranging from management
standards to codes of conduct and detailed global certification schemes.
Next to setting detailed regulative rules, private institutions are gener-
ally believed to fulfill additional functions within the context of private
governance (Pattberg 2004). By providing a forum for deliberation and
conflict resolution, by producing and disseminating valuable knowledge
and information, by providing opportunities for organizational learning,
and by securing independent verification of norm compliance, private
institutions effectively provide an institutionalized response to inter-
twined environmental, social, and economic problems. It is precisely
through these distinct functions that private institutions exercise author-
ity within a given issue area and beyond. These observations are in line
with the assumption that private governance is a functional equivalent of
international governance. Similar to regimes established by states, private
institutions might provide collective goods, reduce transaction costs, and
decrease uncertainty (Keohane 1984).
In sum, private regulative institutions play an important role in shap-
ing the realm of private governance in issue areas ranging from labor
rights and fair trade, to forest politics and biodiversity conservation. Next
to private forms of coordination and rule implementation, the phenome-
non of rule making by private actors gains prominence among IR schol-
ars. But research on these 
 
private regimes
 
 (Haufler 1993) has almost
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exclusively focused on institutionalizations among firms and business
associations, neglecting far-reaching developments of institutionalization
between former adversaries such as environmental and social NGOs,
investors, transnational corporations, and a variety of local or regional
business actors. The corresponding question is why, how, and under what
conditions private actors from different segments of transnational society,
following different organizational and functional logics, engage in close
cooperation that produces transnational regulation beyond the interna-
tional political system.
 
EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: REVIEWING COMMON PROPOSITIONS
 
This section discusses three theoretical literatures that can all be related
to the problem of private institutionalization but represent three different
theoretical backgrounds: first, the concept of private interfirm regimes
that is building on general regime literature; second, the literature on
partnership and collaboration between different actors on the global level
in general; and third, the debate about macrotransformation in the context
of globalization.
Regime literature is interested in, among other questions, explaining
the formation of “normative institutions” that are “based on a persistent
and connected set of rules” (Mayer, Rittberger, and Zürn 1993, 393). The
object of regime analysis is “voluntarily agreed-upon, issue-area specific
normative institutions created by states and other international actors,
which are studied as the mainstay of establishing intentional social order
by self-regulation in international relations” (Mayer et al. 1993, 393).
Therefore, as Haufler argues, “neither the common definition of ‘regime’
nor the fundamental assumptions made about regimes suggest that there
can be no such thing as a purely private regime” (1993, 96). Consequently,
the regime literature is a valuable starting point for theorizing about the
possible causes and conditions of the emergence of private regulatory
institutions.
The puzzle of regime formation has been explored basically along three
lines of argumentation (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997) that are
not mutually exclusive but rather work in tandem. Power-based explana-
tions highlight the importance of power resources, both in monetary and
nonmonetary terms, in bringing about cooperation. The basic premise is
that institutions are structured by and reflect the distribution of power
within a given social system, be it international and public or transna-
tional and private. Interest-based explanations focus on the interactions
of self-interested parties coordinating their behavior to reap joint gains.
The basic premise is that in order to reach cooperation there must be a
zone of agreement or contract, a possible realm of joint gains for all the
participants. The third line of argumentation is labeled knowledge-based
and revolves around the importance of ideas, arguments, and social iden-
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tities. The basic premise holds that the different interests determining a
specific zone of agreement are not exogenously given but subject of cog-
nitive processes and developments such as scientific information and
convergence or general framing of issues.
Recent case studies on private authority have revealed—based on the
classic regime literature—three possible explanations for the emergence
of private interfirm cooperation. Contextual factors and systemic changes
are identified to have a major influence on private institutionalization.
Haufler (2000, 122), for example, argues that the globalization of economic
activities has resulted in “a mismatch between markets and politics in
terms of governance.” Consequently, the “demand for rules to govern
commerce has given rise to a variety of sources of supply, and one of the
most significant . . . is the private sector itself” (Haufler 2000, 121). But
growing private institutionalization of rule making can be explained not
only in terms of macrosystemic transformations, discernible in the recur-
rent failure of governments worldwide to cope with transboundary
problems, but also by applying rationalistic approaches that focus on
utility-maximizing actors as the fundamental heuristic units. Efficiency-
gains approaches analyze cooperation and subsequent institutionaliza-
tion in terms of a possible reduction of transaction costs (Cutler et al.
1999b, 338). In this view, interfirm regimes may reduce costs associated
with information and uncertainty, costs related to negotiations and
consensus seeking, and costs related to the enforcement of regulations. A
second type of rationalistic explanation centers on the factor of power.
From this perspective, institutions are predominantly established because
they enhance the capacity of some actors to exercise power over others
in a given field of competition. These considerations seem to substantiate
the propositions discussed under the framework of international regimes.
But although rationalistic and contextual explanations seem to have some
merits in the case of private institutions, even leading scholars of the field
suggest that it is difficult to disentangle them in practice (Cutler et al.
1999b). Therefore, an integrated approach to the emergence of private
institutions may prove superior to single-factor accounts of formation
(Efinger, Mayer, and Schwarzer 1993, 272–274).
What can be learned from the general regime literature and the more
specific debate about private interfirm regimes for our puzzle of emerging
private regulative institutions as a form of private governance? From a
single-factor perspective, we can assume distinct empirical observations
to substantiate the individual propositions. For power-based assumptions
to be true, they must produce strong leaders in each network who influ-
ence the outcome of the negotiations to their own benefit, or at least a
group of actors who have considerably more power than others in shap-
ing the outcome of the cooperation, in most cases the rules governing
their own behavior. For the interest-based and efficiency-gains approach
to be proven valid, they must result in reduced transaction costs, better
positions in the market, and reputation gains. These objectives should be
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identified by the partnering organizations before the establishment of the
institution and not just occur as the unintended result of cooperation.
Furthermore, a possible zone of agreement should be imaginable for all
the participants of the arrangement before the actual institutionalization.
For contextual factors to be decisive, there must be evidence for large-
scale transformation or eruptive events within a given policy field. Obser-
vations could include a new influential discourse, absence or inadequacy
of governmental and intergovernmental regulation, the emergence of new
scientific knowledge, or an environmental catastrophe. We should keep
in mind that although regime theory provides us with a range of possible
propositions, a simple application of findings from either the inter-
national regimes literature or the interfirm and business regimes perspec-
tive to the case of private regulatory institutions seems to be at least
problematic.
A second approach to the question of private institutionalization can
be found in the growing literature on “partnership politics” (Eisler 1996,
565). Next to studies on public–private partnerships and interorganiza-
tional collaboration, researchers started to address business–NGO part-
nerships in the mid-1990s. This research strategy is action–oriented but
nevertheless provides useful insights into the specific types and rationales
of business–NGO partnerships (Heap 1998; Long and Arnold 1995; Mur-
phy and Bendell 1997). The existing policy-oriented studies on partner-
ships identify four preconditions for business actors and NGOs to engage
in cooperation. The first precondition is perceived or actual decline in the
effectiveness of state regulation with regard to the enforcement of envi-
ronmental and social regulation, both on the national and international
level. The second precondition is acknowledgment on the part of the
NGOs that large transnational corporations are both cause and possible
solution of global problems, while the third is the impact of new NGO
campaigning strategies that focus on corporate brand reputation and thus
threaten the market position of companies. The fourth precondition is the
recognition on the part of the companies that NGOs have acquired power
and legitimacy as agents of social change, thus presenting themselves as
potential partners for solving pressing business problems.
The third broad theoretical approach considered here focuses on the
global political economy as an explanatory factor for large-scale transfor-
mations. The debate about globalization and the changing role of the
nation-state in addressing transboundary problems makes three claims
regarding the relation between globalization and the rise of private forms
of global governance (Falkner 2003, 74).
The first claim stresses the relationship between globalization and the
perceived decline of the nation-state system. From this perspective, pri-
vate governance is an indicator for a long-term shift in the locus of
authority, especially within the realm of the global economy. Private
actors have become the “real players” in issue areas ranging from
financial stability and foreign investment (e.g., bond-rating agencies) to
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industrial standard setting (e.g., International Organization for Standard-
ization). As a result, “the powers of most states have declined still further,
so that their authority over the people and their activities inside their
territorial boundaries has weakened” (Strange 1996, xi).
The second claim addresses the hypothetical link between the growth
of civil society and the emergence of private governance. In this view,
civil society pressure exerted on corporations, accompanied by far-
reaching media coverage, is seen as a main cause for the emergence of
institutionalized responses to the growing demand for corporate social
and environmental accountability (Wapner 1997).
The third claim is closely related to the work of Antonio Gramsci. In
this view, novel relations between states, business actors, international
organizations, and civil society institutions signify a shift from more
traditional forms of politics to market-oriented, corporate-sponsored
regimes that clearly benefit corporate interests (Falkner 2003, 75). The
applicability of this concept to the realm of private governance stems from
the particular importance of business and civil society as central catego-
ries within the framework of private institutionalization. Neo-Gramscian
theory seems capable of explaining the current transformation of the
economic arena, which is driven by a hegemonic bloc of business and
society elites, resulting in a new approach to regulation such as market-
driven self-regulation. Within this institutional setting, a managerial elite
from multinational corporations, transnational NGOs, academia, and
governmental agencies comprises a transnational historical bloc, exercis-
ing leadership as a consequence of individual and collective human acts
(Cox 1987; Germain and Kenny 1998, 6; Pijl 1997). In this view, NGOs are
not natural adversaries of business interests but play a dual role as “are-
nas of cultural and ideological struggle, and also as key allies in securing
hegemonic stability” (Levy and Newell 2002, 90).
The aforementioned three broad theoretical approaches toward the
phenomenon of private institutions in global governance—regime theory,
partnership politics, and studies in global political economy—contain
valuable propositions with regards to the emergence of private institu-
tions. Four recurrent aspects seem to be important, although they receive
different degrees of attention in the respective literatures: (1) macrosys-
temic transformations such as globalization or hegemonic reconfiguration
as well as contextual factors on the macrolevel, (2) problem structure,
characterized by interdependent interests as well as different levels of
information and knowledge, (3) organizational resources that enable
actors to reduce transaction costs or improve their strategic position, and
(4) ideas, knowledge, and information. For analytical purposes, these
aspects can be grouped into two broad categories, one containing the
microlevel conditions, the other those observable on the macrolevel.
Microlevel conditions contain the problem structure and organizational
resources because these are dependent on the specific issue area and the
actors involved. Macrolevel conditions relate to large-scale trans-
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formations in the structure of the international system as well as to the
emergence and dissemination of ideas and knowledge.
 
PRIVATE RULES IN PRIVATE NETWORKS: UNDERSTANDING 
THE FSC AND CERES
 
The following section considers two empirical cases from the field of
environmental politics in the light of the aforementioned theoretical prop-
ositions. After briefly discussing the institutional setup and rules estab-
lished, I turn to the enabling factors for institutionalization of private
regulation involving companies and civil society organizations. I assess
the conditions for institutionalization along the four recurrent themes
identified in this section. The two case studies are based on expert inter-
views with staff members, board representatives, and a range of addi-
tional stakeholders as well as on written documentation and secondary
sources.
 
The Environment at Risk: CERES
 
CERES started operating in 1989 with publishing the so-called Valdez
principles, utilizing the huge public outrage around the Exxon Valdez oil
spill, which occurred on March 24. A group of socially responsible inves-
tors that was mainly organized in the Social Investment Forum and 15
large environmental groups started discussing the possibility of using the
power of investors (shareholder resolutions) against the power of the
boardroom. The idea behind CERES is to engage companies in dialogue
and work toward the subsequent endorsement of environmental princi-
ples that establish a long-term corporate commitment to a continual
progress in environmental performance. The 10-point code of corporate
environmental conduct establishes “an environmental ethic with criteria
by which investors and others can assess the environmental performance
of companies” (CERES 2002b, 31). Principle 10 requires an annual self-
evaluation by the endorsing company based on the CERES reporting form
by which the required continual progress toward environmental respon-
sibility can be measured. As a result, environmental improvements, low-
ered investment risks, and positive corporate performance go hand in
hand.
To date, more than 70 companies have endorsed the CERES principles,
including the annual reporting commitment. Among the CERES endors-
ers are large multinational corporations such as American Airlines, Bank
of America, Coca-Cola U.S.A., Ford Motor Company, General Motors
(GM), and Sunoco, as well as small and medium-sized firms, including
environmental frontrunners such as The Body Shop International or
Aveda Corporation. The second pillar that supports CERES is the CERES
coalition, a network of around 90 organizations, including environmental
advocacy groups, public interest and community groups, as well as an
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array of investors, analysts, and financial advisers representing more than
$300 billion in invested capital. A board of 21 distinguished individuals
governs CERES. The day-to-day operations are supervised by an execu-
tive director and carried out by a staff of 16 people located in Boston, MA.
Although endorsing companies are not directly represented on the CERES
board, corporate representatives participate in various committees set up
by the board to develop and implement programs and project and in this
function regularly attend CERES board meetings. A further avenue of
influence for corporations is the annual CERES conference that draws
together almost all coalition members and endorsers to discuss the issue
of corporate environmental commitment from a long-term perspective.
As William Clay Ford, chairman of the board of Ford Motor Company,
noted, “[t]he CERES annual conference is helping to establish not only
the agenda of the next century, but also the relationships we will need to
solve some very daunting issues” (CERES 2001, 9).
The regulatory dimension of CERES as an institution contains two
related aspects: The first aspect refers to the principles that establish a
normative framework for companies to operate in. The second aspect
pertains to a standardized format for corporate environmental reporting
that prescribes the form and content of public disclosure (CERES 1999a).
Each aspect can be considered a major success. Many companies have
published an environmental mission statement drawing on the original
Valdez principles. To date, more than 2,000 companies worldwide regu-
larly publish environmental reports. The CERES report form gained so
much credibility that it provided the basis for the global sustainability
reporting guidelines operated by the GRI, a tripartite network of NGOs,
corporations, and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
CERES not only provided substantial knowledge and information but
also served as the secretariat and organizational driver until the GRI
became an independent organization in 2000.
When institutional investors and representatives of major environmen-
tal organizations convened at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in April 1989
to discuss ways of improving the environmental and social impacts of
investments, a whole range of controversial issues waited to be solved.
For social investors and their clients, the lack of information about the
environmental performance of companies was a real risk for their busi-
ness. Information came either from the companies themselves that dis-
play advanced public relations skills rather than substantial information,
or from advocacy groups addressing their specific constituencies. Neither
companies nor advocacy groups served the need of a growing social
investment community. Little help came from governmental regulation
at that time because measures focused on specific substances, like in the
case of the Toxic Release Inventory established in 1987, rather than on
environmental performance in its entirety. NGOs for their part began to
realize that conventional lobbying strategies aimed at governments were
becoming less efficient, while at the same time business actors emerged
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as major threats to the environment. The catastrophe of Bhopal in 1984
and the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989 had brought corporate misbehavior
to the forefront of public concern. As a result, companies, although reluc-
tant in the beginning, started to look for credible ways to secure brand
reputation and profits in the midst of a hostile public environment. In
sum, interdependent stakeholders having vested interests in the problem,
disproportional levels of expertise and information as well as different
perspectives resulting in an adversarial relationship characterized the
problem structure.
After two more meetings among the original coalition members, the
negotiations led to the formulation and public announcement of the Val-
dez principles on September 7, 1989, resulting in considerable media
coverage and public attention. Already this early phase of negotiations
showed an interesting feature. Debates were not based on positional
negotiation and confrontational strategies but on a common framework
of reference from where future visions could develop.
Two ideas, one practical, the other more visionary, served as influential
institutional models. The first idea is that the system of standardized
financial accounting that emerged in collaboration between public and
private actors in the U.S. is controlled and monitored by the Financial
Accounting Board. The second idea, which had a considerable impact on
the coalition members’ ability to identify a common platform for action,
was to use shareholder petitions to challenge corporate behavior, as in the
case of the Sullivan principles applied to U.S. companies operating in
South Africa under the apartheid regime. The Sullivan principles origi-
nated in 1977, when Reverend Leon Sullivan, a Baptist minister, issued
his code of conduct in an attempt to end discrimination against black
workers in South Africa oppressed by the country’s policy of apartheid.
This initiative helped to focus attention on the issue of racial injustice in
South Africa within the international business by promoting criteria for
socially responsible investment practices. The Sullivan principles are even
credited for having contributed to the end of apartheid. Both the idea of
financial accounting and the Sullivan principles have been of considerable
importance in the process of institutionalization because they created a
common framework of reference under which adversarial standpoints
could be integrated into a shared practical vision.
Shortly after the public announcement of the Valdez principles, coali-
tion members engaged in an intense dialogue with corporations in order
to test their willingness to adopt the principles and commit themselves
to periodical reporting. However, although the Aveda Corporation
became the first signatory to the Valdez principles on November 22, 1989
(CERES 1999b), it took another three years to institutionalize the cooper-
ation with a wide range of corporate actors. After several rounds of talks
with companies the principles were amended and renamed in 1992.
Sunoco became the first Fortune 500 company to endorse the new CERES
principles in February 1993. GM followed in 1994. Several contextual
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factors can be identified that affected the early process of institutionaliza-
tion between investors, advocacy groups, and corporations. First, envi-
ronmental catastrophes, especially the Exxon Valdez incident, have
triggered widespread public concern about the environmental integrity
of major companies. Second, the beginning information revolution and
increasing business activities on the global level radically changed both
the importance and availability of information. As Joan Bavaria recalls in
retrospective:
 
this need [for principles and reporting] arose just as an information revolution
was starting to race around the world. We sensed that this was a real revolution,
with implications for our economy, environment, and culture as sweeping as
those that accompanied the agricultural revolution or the industrial revolution.
(CERES 1998, 2)
 
As a third contextual factor, the rhetorical as well as practical support that
the Clinton administration gave to cooperative approaches, voluntary
initiatives, and partnership concepts seemed to have played a role.
When CERES became more institutionalized, neither the investment
community and the environmental organization nor the endorsing com-
panies knew exactly what the outcome would be of that process in terms
of joint gains and mutual benefits. This does clearly contradict standard
transaction cost explanations for cooperation. A good example in case is
the engagement with GM, the world’s largest automobile corporation.
The CERES performance review of GM, conducted in 2001 and covering
the first five years of institutional cooperation, notes:
 
The world’s largest corporation was joining hands with a relatively unfamiliar,
yet potentially very influential, coalition of environmental groups and socially
responsible investors. The outcomes were uncertain, and there were many
skeptics on both sides. . . .  Together GM and CERES hoped to harvest potential
benefits in admittedly unknown and probably rough terrain. (CERES 2002a, 5)
 
What has been more important than a clear perception of future gains
were four distinct organizational resources available in the process of
institutionalization: the ability to frame the problem in a way that is
meaningful to other stakeholders, the information necessary to solve it,
the impact to make an actual difference in the given issue area, and the
credibility to construct a joint solution acceptable to all the participants.
Social investors were able to address the problem of corporate environ-
mental performance because they represented not only social visions
but substantial capital interests as well. By filing shareholder petitions,
they made companies aware of the growing demand for environmental
disclosure. But investors needed the support of nonpartisan environ-
mental organizations to offer corporations the reputation benefit and
added value necessary to engage them in cooperation. The companies,
for their part, provided the information requested by investors and the
commitment envisaged by the NGOs to make a real difference on the
ground.
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In sum, the CERES case confirms the importance of private demand
for a certain regulatory framework in the absence of appropriate gov-
ernmental or international responses. A distinct problem structure cre-
ates demand from different sides of the stakeholder spectrum. What
seems important is that one actor holds the leverage to make the prob-
lem a business issue, in this case the social investors through the intense
use of shareholder petitions. Furthermore, ideas seem to matter in
allowing different actors to agree on a mutual frame of reference as the
basis for future action. Although the environmental community did
reject the approach in the very beginning, the idea of environmental
principles, coupled with standardized reporting provided a common
point of reference that was used as a strong long-term vision to bridge
existing differences. The macrolevel of conditions plays a twofold role in
the case. First, contextual factors such as the Exxon Valdez catastrophe
provided an additional impulse for successful private regulation. Sec-
ond, macroshifts in the economic realm drove corporate actors to the
forefront of public attention. What could not be confirmed was a simple
power or interest-based explanation. What rather seem to be influential
are available organizational resources that can be exchanged to create a
zone of joint gains. Although companies did achieve gains such as posi-
tive brand reputation, the initial cooperation process was marked by
uncertainty with regard to the possible outcome. What seems to be of
further importance is the existence of an institutional entrepreneur, a
committed individual generating momentum for the respective idea,
similar to the concept of a norm entrepreneur as discussed by
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). These findings indicate that an inte-
grated model, combining micro and macrostructures, is better equipped
to understand the emergence of private regulatory institutions than a
single-factor account.
 
Certifying Sustainability: The FSC
 
The FSC was founded in 1993 by a general assembly of interested parties
in Toronto, Canada. Among the 126 participants from 26 countries were
concerned individuals and representatives from a wide range of organi-
zations, including environmental NGOs, retailers, trade unions, and
indigenous interest groups. Although consultations among forest produc-
ers, retailers, and environmental and social interest groups had been
going on since 1990, it was not until 1994 that the founding members of
FSC agreed upon the “FSC Standards and Principles,” the substantive
basis of FSC’s work with regard to the definition and operationalization
of sustainable forestry (FSC 2000). The idea behind the FSC is to certify
forest-management operations according to a detailed standard. Certifi-
cation and continual verification of commitment is carried out by inde-
pendent certification organizations that are accredited by the FSC
according to specific rules.
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In contrast to CERES, FSC, being a network of coalition members and
endorsing companies, is constituted as a membership organization. The
General Assembly (GA), a tripartite body that represents business, social,
and environmental interests within three chambers, governs the FSC. The
GA elects a board of directors that mirrors the principal governance
structure. Each chamber sends three members to the board for a three-
year term. The board decides on all issues of major importance, from
approving national representatives and initiatives of the FSC, to allocating
the annual budget, to approving new standards. The operational work of
the FSC is handled by the FSC international secretariat located in Bonn,
Germany, and supervised by an executive director who is appointed by
the board. Whereas the day-to-day operations of the FSC are in the
responsibility of the international secretariat and its executive director,
and questions of major importance are decided by the board of directors,
only the GA is authorized to change the fundamental “standards and
principles” as well as the statutes of the FSC. Currently, the FSC incorpo-
rates about 600 individual and organizational members, 36 national
initiatives, and 15 independent certification organizations within its
network. Member organizations include large economic actors such as
IKEA, The Home Depot, and B&Q; national and international environ-
mental advocacy groups, for example Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund
for Nature (WWF), and Friends of the Earth; and a wide range of social
advocacy groups, including the German trade union IG Bau and indige-
nous campaigns within their scope.
As a private regulatory institution, the FSC produces three different
basic types of standards: (1) global forest-management standards that
form the basis for national and regional standards development, (2) chain
of custody standards prescribing detailed rules along the production
chain, and (3) standards for accreditation. The standards are developed
and drafted by the standards and policies unit within the international
secretariat and later approved by the board of directors. To date, more
than 52 million hectares of forests worldwide are certified according to
FSC standards, amounting to 5% of trade in forests products. From 1996
to 2005, the FSC has issued 4,500 certificates, both for forest management
and chain of custody.
In March 1991, a group of timber users, traders, and representatives of
social and environmental organizations convened in California to discuss
the need for a credible system for identifying well-managed forests as an
acceptable resource of forest products (FSC and WWF-Germany 2002, 6).
One year later, WWF had teamed up with major retailers in the U.K. to
form the U.K. Forest and Trade Network. In October 1993, the FSC held
its first general assembly after an 18-month intense consultation period
in 10 countries, including the U.S., Canada, Sweden, and Peru. Several
distinct features characterize the problem structure that underlay this
process of institutionalization. Media coverage on tropical deforestation
and related social issues such as the Amazonian rubber tappers’ protest
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against illegal logging and the subsequent investment in cattle quickly
turned “tropical timber” into a negative synonym for environmental deg-
radation and human exploitation. Buying mahogany furniture had
become a critical issue among northern consumers by the late 1980s. With
environmental organizations organizing boycotts against tropical-timber
retailers, and some governments discussing the possibility of banning
timber import, companies were looking for new ways to protect their
profits. Major business players quickly realized that in fact they could not
account for the origin and nature of their raw materials. This created a
need for transparent product labels, which were nonexistent at that time.
Some NGOs for their part were unhappy with the debate focusing only
on timber boycott, which the WWF especially saw as contraproductive.
Instead, WWF-U.K. conducted a seminar on the forest problem entitled
“Forests Are Your Business,” resulting in the WWF 95 group. Ten major
do-it-yourself and furniture companies agreed to phase out by 1995 the
purchase and sale of nonsustainable wood and wood products (Bendell
and Murphy 2000, 70). The competing needs of the major stakeholders
became evident at that point in time. An increasingly competitive global
market for timber products drove large multinational corporations while
at the same time brand reputation became a major topic of concern. Small
forest owners wanted their share of the market but to maintain indepen-
dence; communities relied on forests to finance community infrastructure;
indigenous people demanded the recognition of fundamental rights,
while workers sought to secure employment and fundamental labor stan-
dards. Environmental organizations in their term focused on protecting
and preserving the integrity of the forest ecosystems.
Around the same time, the ongoing negotiations on an international
agreement on the world’s forest raised expectations among NGOs and
corporations for a credible solution to their problems. Although the first
international response to the problem of deforestation, the International
Tropical Timber Agreement focusing on trade in tropical-timber products,
was already agreed on in 1983, it was not until the late 1980s that the
international community reached a consensus on the necessity to consider
a global approach to the forest problem. In the end, it was the failure of
the intergovernmental process that gave an additional burst to the idea
of private forest certification. For Timothy Synnott, FSC’s first executive
director until January 2001, it is evident that “[a] clear impulse for the
formation of FSC in 1993 came out of the failure of the Rio conference in
1992 and its failure to produce a legally binding forestry element” (FSC
and WWF-Germany 2002, 8). And Francis Sullivan, member of WWF-
U.K. and involved in the WWF 95 group and FSC, argued that one cannot
sit back and wait for governments to agree. Instead, working with people
and companies who might get things done could be the right thing to do
(Bendell and Murphy 2000, 69).
Although the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED) was unable to deliver a binding agreement on the
 THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 605
 
world’s forests, it nevertheless provided important guidance for the FSC
process. The Rio conference was the place where the concept of sustain-
ability rose to its greatest appreciation. Based on the 1987 Brundtland
Report, UNCED agreed on the Agenda 21 as the blueprint for sustainabil-
ity in the 21
 
st
 
 century. The document calls on governments to identify
appropriate national strategies for the sustainable use of forest resources,
acknowledging the crucial contribution of nongovernmental actors and
business interests. For Peter Prokosch, chief executive officer of WWF-
Germany, the FSC constitutes the “archetype of the participatory process
envisioned by Agenda 21” (FSC and WWF-Germany 2002, 3). The idea of
participation and equal representation based on the general assumption
of the sustainability discourse that environmental, social, and economic
interests are of the same value has been an important prerequisite for
cooperation between the different stakeholders. Especially the unique
tripartite governance structure, ensuring equal representation of all inter-
ests, has served as an early point of reference and a common ground for
future negotiations. Although difficult to measure, individual commit-
ment seems to have played a decisive role in the emergence of the FSC.
As interviews with current staff members of FSC indicate, special credit
for getting the FSC started is given to individuals at WWF who
approached British companies with a view to partnership and not
conflict.
Similar to the CERES case, available organizational resources played a
greater role in the process of institutionalization than strategic reduction
of transaction costs. Although companies were able to minimize cost, for
example by eliminating intermediate traders based on information they
obtained through the cooperation with local NGOs, this has been an
unintended consequence rather than a clear strategic vision on the part
of the companies. More decisive was the fact that NGOs were perceived
as legitimate social actors by the public and thus could deliver the much
needed credibility to forest certification systems. Furthermore, NGOs pro-
vided expert knowledge on many complex issues related to the technical
aspects of certification as well as to their ecological functions. Retailers
for their part could exercise pressure on the forest industry by demanding
certified raw materials and products, inducing change in the actual prac-
tices of forestry. Forest managers perceived the chance to increase their
profit margins by positioning themselves on the newly emerging market
for sustainable timber.
In sum, the case of the FSC seems to confirm the importance of a
distinct problem structure creating demand for regulation that cannot be
met by an international agreement. With NGOs making timber trade a
real consumer issue and governments unable to agree on binding regu-
lations, companies sought new allies to save their core business interests.
NGOs emerged not only as corporate critics but also as possible solutions
to the problem. An integrative idea based on the norms embodied in the
Brundtland Report and Agenda 21 served as the common point of
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reference within the negotiations. In addition, individual commitment
was crucial to realize cooperation when the opportunity occurred.
 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE IN 
WORLD POLITICS
 
This article argues that the recent phenomenon of private governance in
world politics goes beyond common forms of private cooperation because
it involves not only adjustments of behavior toward mutual goals but also
shared norms, principles, and roles. As a result, private governance is
believed to include private systems of rule that exist mainly outside of
the international system of governance. The article further suggests that
the explanatory factors for the emergence of private systems of rule are
best thought of as a set of four conditions—two on a macrolevel and two
on a microlevel of political structures. In this view, macrosystemic trans-
formations, resulting in perceived or actual decline of public regulatory
power, the emergence of civil society as a legitimate and credible actor,
and increased environmental and social impact of corporate players, as
well as powerful ideas that serve as common points of reference constitute
the macrolevel of necessary conditions. On the microlevel, the structure
of the problem and the available organizational resources of the actors
involved constitute the necessary conditions for private regulatory insti-
tutions to emerge.
The two condition sets are supposed to be interconnected and form an
integrated model of private regulatory institutions’ emergence because
distinct variables are systematically interacting with each other and thus
jointly producing a certain result (Efinger et al. 1993, 273). It is further
assumed that the distinct interplay between the macro- and the microlevel
of conditions creates a window of opportunity for the emergence of pri-
vate regulatory institutions. Institutionalization is thus understood to be
a dynamic process.
The advantage of analyzing private governance along a macrolevel/
microlevel distinction is twofold: First, the systematic interactions of fac-
tors as well as the specific mechanisms operating therein become evident.
Consider, for example, the proposition that public pressure can explain
the emergence of coregulative systems of rule. The empirical cases ana-
lyzed in this article have shown that pressure is a decisive factor but
operates through different pathways—publicly orchestrated boycott or
more clandestine shareholder petitions—that are dependent on the prob-
lem structure and organizational resources. Second, the proposed model
allows for a systematic treatment of major factors by offering a structured
approach to the analysis of private governance. A consecutive treatment
of the macro- and microstructures in the analytical process could assure
researchers that no major factor has gone unnoticed.
Drawing on the two cases, a common narrative can be presented. In
this view, distinct problem structures, different levels of information and
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knowledge as well as adversarial relationships among stakeholders create
demand that is not met by public regulation. The ability to create private
demand for regulation and to find a common solution rests on the orga-
nizational resources of distinct actors. These resources are a result of
rather large-scale transformations. NGOs and other social actors have
emerged as an accepted corrective to public actors while at the same time
corporations acquired both greater environmental impact and public vis-
ibility. In this situation, ideas can help to integrate these resources (civil
society pressure, public acceptance, and environmental impact) for a joint
solution. In short, when private regulatory demand, being a result of
strategy and macrosystemic transformations, is not met by adequate pub-
lic supply, a broad inclusive idea can help to integrate resources that can
be mutually exchanged to solve the multiparty problem.
In sum, an integrated model, combining the macrolevel and microlevel
of political structures, has proved helpful in the analysis of private gov-
ernance. This approach is helpful because it draws attention to a variety
of interlinkages between different conditions that would not be observ-
able using a single-factor account. First, the relation between shifts on the
macrolevel and new resources for organizational actors, leading to new
strategic choices; second, the relation between resources and the problem
structure, addressing the ability of actors to construct a problem in the
first place; and third, the relation between ideas that emerge and diffuse
on the macrolevel and the subsequent integration of competing perspec-
tives in the actual negotiations.
 
NOTE
1. Judith Richter has pointed to the fact that the term partnership represents
a policy paradigm based on the assumption of trust, shared benefits, and
an underlying win-win situation, concealing the fundamentally different
goals and power resources of the actors involved (Richter 2001). This article
uses the concept of partnership as a value neutral term, equivalent with
cooperation.
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